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PRODUCT IDENTITY AND BRANDING UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: IS THE FTC's APPROACH
CONSISTENT WITH THE REALITIES OF
THE MARKETPLACE?
ARTHUR
I.

THAT

INTRODUCTION:

D.

AUSTINt

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT' poses more problems

of interpretation in its application than any other piece of legis-

lation in the trade regulation repertory has been stated well beyond
the point of redundancy. The final draft of the act, subject as it was
to the cross-currents of various pressure groups, lacks a quality of
clarity that is so necessary to a legislative program that is designed
to regulate a significant portion of the economy. Mr. Justice Frankfurter justly pointed out in an oft quoted remark that "precision of
expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman
Act." 2 Hence, as might have been anticipated, the Federal Trade
Commission, the courts and counsel have all experienced substantial
difficulty in discovering and maintaining consistency of interpretation.
Added to the problem of obscure syntax has been the emergence of
new and innovative market techniques that were either unknown or in
an embryonic stage of development when it was enacted.
Thus it is not surprising that a company (in this article the
hypothetical Retainer Company) could very easily discover itself in
the following predicament:
The Retainer Company produces and markets milk products on
a national scale. Because of constant efforts at quality production and
a continuous flow of intensive promotional campaigning the company's
products have, over the years, been highly regarded by the public.
Milk carrying the Retainer label is normally sold to retailers at 50 cents
a quart. At the urging of several regional supermarket chains the
Company adopted the policy of packaging its milk in containers that
were marked with the brand of the particular supermarket. The private branded milk was usually sold at 45 cents per quart. In other
t Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School of BaldwinWallace College. B.S., University of Virginia, 1958; LL.B., Tulane University, 1963.
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
2. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v.FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953). For a
collection of additional critical commentary see Rowt, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THe ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 535 n.4 (1962). See generally Eine Kleine Juristische
Schlummergeschichte, 79 HARv. L. Rv. 921 (1966).
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words, the Retainer Company was selling milk under their brand
at 50 cents per quart while the same milk, produced and packaged by
Retainer, but with a private label was being sold at five cents less.
The FTC issued a cease and desist order under the Robinson-Patman
Act on the basis that the Retainer Company was discriminating against
those retailers who paid 50 cents a quart by selling a "like grade and
quality"' commodity (milk packaged under a private brand) to a
select group of supermarkets at 45 cents a quart.
In the Richmond, Virginia sales area Retainer Company sold its
milk at the usual price of 50 cents per quart. Three other national
brands also sold at that price but they did little business in the Richmond area. Despite the apparent lack of competitors, Retainer was
getting stiff competition from the Colonial Corporation, a local concern who marketed "Intrepid" brand of milk at 46 cents a quart. The
only difference between the Retainer product and Intrepid was the
brand name, the shape of the package, and the price. Both brands
contained the same chemical ingredients. As a matter of fact, Intrepid
was produced by one of Retainer's national competitors. On June 1,
the price of Intrepid was lowered to 44 cents. When Retainer saw
that its sales dipped sharply they followed with a 2 cents reduction of
their own, still maintaining the normal 4 cents price differential. However, when Intrepid went down to 42 cents, Retainer also dropped
its price to 42 cents a quart, thus completely erasing the price differential between the two brands. At this point the Trade Commission
filed suit, alleging a section 2 (a) price discrimination violation 'in
that the Retainer Company was charging less in the Richmond area
for its milk and was, therefore, discriminating against those less
favorably situated customers residing in outlying areas. Retainer's
defense was that instead of discriminating they were actually meeting
competition in good faith by charging the same price as their competitor. Acknowledging the product similarity in terms of physical
and chemical properties between the Retainer and Intrepid brands, the
Trade Commission nevertheless denied the good faith meeting of
competition defense on the theory that Retainer vended a "premium"
product which, because of consumer preference, normally commanded
a higher price than Intrepid, a so-called "regular" product. Consequently, Retainer Company, by disturbing the "normal" four cents
price differential between the two brands, had not met competition,
but in reality had undercut the prices of a competitor.
3. Section 2(a) makes it unlawful "[T]o discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce.... ." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
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The two sets of events described above represent an apparent
contradiction. In both situations the products involved contain the
same physical or chemical properties. Yet the treatment by the FTC
is different in each case. The first case involved an interpretation
of the jurisdictional requirement of "like grade and quality" under
section 2 (a) of the act. Where the products are composed of identical
chemical properties, the Trade Commission's policy, affirmed recently
by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Borden Co.,4 is to ignore the market
impact of 'brands, be they national or private, and to consider the
commodities to be of "like grade and quality."5
In the second situation, the seller is attempting to invoke the
section 2 (b) defense which allows him to demonstrate that his "lower
price .. .was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor ..
."' Although there is no "like grade and quality"

requirement in the section 2 (b) proviso, it is obvious that a meaningful application requires that product similarity be read into it. This
the courts and the Commission have done. 7 However, as the second
hypothetical indicates, they have applied a totally different product
identity standard when interpreting section 2 (b). Under the good
faith meeting of competition proviso, brands are very definitely a
controlling factor; a premium brand is "different" from a regular
brand - despite the fact that they contain the same ingredients.
Is the FTC's approach, ambivalent as it is, justified? The best
means of gaining a valid perspective of this problem is to examine both
positions in terms of relevant judicial pronouncements, critical commentary, and contemporary marketing techniques, and to measure
the results of the inquiries against the broad purposes of the RobinsonPatman Act.
II.

THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF LIKE GRADE AND
QUALITY:

FTC v. Borden Co.

Before the Trade Commission can conduct a price discrimination
investigation under section 2 (a) they must first establish that corn4. 383 U.S. 637 (1966).

5. On the other hand, the Commission has attempted to use brand identity as a

basis for holding dissimilar products to be of like grade and quality. Atalanta Trading

Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956). The Commission held that hams of varying sizes, pork
shoulders, loin roll, cottage butts and chopped ham, all sold under the trade name

"Unox," were of like grade and quality. This theory was subsequently overruled by
the Second Circuit. Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
6. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
7. See Callaway Mills Co., sub nom. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., TRADE REG.
REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 1 16,800 (FTC 1964) ;Gerber Prods. Co.v. BeechNut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54
F.T.C. 277 (1957); Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953); Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
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modities of "like grade and quality" are involved in the sales transactions. There are two basic and recognized avenues of approach to
the requirement: First, goods may be considered dissimilar because
of discernible physical or chemical variations or, secondly, it might
be said that products, otherwise physically the same, are distinguishable because different brands or labels engender such a variance in
consumer reaction that one product consistently sells for a higher
price than the other. The first position is commonly known as the
"physical identity" test; the second position is usually called "consumer preference" or "market acceptability." It is the latter standard,
its genesis resting in the sophistication and refinement of contemporary
advertising techniques and in the accompanying expansion of promotional budgets, that has prompted much of the confusion that
surrounds the interpretation of "like grade and quality." The FTC
has historically refused to acknowledge that physically identical but
differently labeled products are not of "like grade and quality."' The
Supreme Court, in FTC v. Borden Co., has embraced the Commission's view.
A.

Premium Brand in Competition with Private Brand

Borden Company manufactures and sells food and dairy products.
It has, along with the Pet and Carnation companies, a nationally known
reputation.' In addition to marketing its national brand of evaporated
milk, Borden will also, upon request, make the very same evaporated
milk available to distributors in unbranded containers. The distributor
is then free to attach his own "private" label to the container and
compete with Borden (or Pet and Carnation). The fact that Borden
always sold the unmarked milk to distributors at lower prices than it
charged for milk sold under its own brand prompted the Trade Commission to file price discrimination charges under section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act.1 The issue was crystal clear: if the Borden
8. See Whitaker Cable Corp., 51 F.T.C. 958 (1955) ; Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C.
395 (1953) ; United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950) ; United States Rubber
Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939) ; Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938) ; Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936).
9. In 1957 Borden's total sales exceeded $900,000,000 and in 1956 its sales of
evaporated milk totaled over $30,000,000. Brief for Respondent, pp. 3-4, Borden Co. v.
FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
10. Primary line discrimination was predicated on findings that:
[T]he evaporated milk industry has suffered a decline in sales . . .that since
1950 at least ten concerns, mostly in the Midwest market area involved in the
case, have discontinued production of evaporated milk . . . that because of the
competitive situation of respondent and its competitors in the Midwest market
area, "Little is needed to shift the competitive balance" . . . that, in contrast to
its competitors, the respondent is "a large and powerful concern" . . . and that
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branded milk (Silver Cow) and the privately labeled milk were
analyzed in terms of the "market acceptability" test they would be
dissimilar as far as the grade and quality jurisdictional requirement
was concerned, and, of course, inquiry under section 2 (a) would be
at an end. On the other hand, if the "physical identity" test were
applied, inquiry would proceed to the question of price discrimination.
The Supreme Court, by a 7-2 vote, adopted the physical identity
test. Grade and quality are to be defined by the physical and chemical
characteristics of the product and not by extraneous influences. Thus,
"consumer preferences, brand acceptability or what customers think of
[the product] . . .and are willing to pay for it"" are not relevant.

Although relying upon previous holdings by the Trade Commission
and on the legislative dialogue accompanying enactment of the act
to support their holding, the Court was more concerned with the
possibilities to avoid the intended thrust of the Robinson-Patman Act
that the market acceptability test would provide. 2
Mr. Justice White reasoned that if the heavily promoted premium
product is considered "different," then by "selling some unspecified
amount of each product to some unspecified portion of his customers,
however large or small the price differential might be,"' 8 the vendor
would be able to manipulate or "rig" consumer preference and brand
acceptability, and thereby erase "like grade and quality" whenever he
desired. Or he would be able to sell at different prices the same product
packaged under his own two different labels merely because he advertises one brand more than the other.
The majority clearly feels that the paramount obstacle to the
market acceptability test is that it would furnish the manufacturer
with an open invitation to maneuver his advertising and sales promotional policy in such a manner as to create, whenever it was to his
advantage, a varied consumer reaction to a specified brand. Before
respondent entered the market using "a discriminatory pricing structure" which
"put a severe strain on the smaller competitors"....

Brief for Petitioner, p. 6, FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
Secondary Line discrimination "rested on the testimony that retailers and wholesalers who purchased the Borden brand would have bought the substantially lowerpriced private label milk if it had been made available to them ... and that, because of
'the extremely low or non-existent profit margins on evaporated milk' . . . the unavailability of this lower-priced product subjected them to a substantial competitive
disadvantage." Brief, p. 7.
11. 383 U.S. at 641.
12. The Court concluded that the Commission should be allowed to proceed to the
merits and "determine . . . whether the differential under attack is discriminatory
within the meaning of the Act, whether competition may be injured, and whether the
differential is cost justified or is defensible as a good-faith effort to meet the price of
a competitor." 383 U.S. at 646. See generally Note, The "Like Grade and Quality"
Clause of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Construction To Effect the Objectives of the
Act, 49 MINN. L. P v. 1176 (1965).
13. 383 U.S. at 644.
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analyzing the majority's position it would be advisable to spell out
with some precision and within the context of the Borden factual
background a definition of the market acceptability test:
The product purchased by a consumer includes not only the
chemical components that any competent laboratory can itemize,
but also a host of commercial intangibles that distinguish the
product in the market-place. The premium paid for Borden
brand milk reflects consumer's awareness, promoted through advertising, that these commercial attributes are part and parcel
of the premium product he is purchasing.' 4
The sum total of the "commercial intangibles" is, of course, manfested in consumer preference. Thus a mere difference in labels or
brands, standing alone, would not automatically, as the majority
infers, be sufficient under the market acceptability test to dispell product
similarity. Instead, it is the capacity of one brand to attract higher
prices over a sustained period of time that furnishes the necessary
"difference" that results in the products being distinguishable under
section 2 (a). Consumer preference is controlled by advertising and
other promotional techniques. By and large, it is advertising that sets
the line of demarcation between the nationally known brand or the
"premium" product and the privately branded product. And, as mentioned, it is the possible use of advertising by the vendor to create
marginal variances in consumer preference that disturbs the majority.
This concern is unwarranted. For one thing, the cost of mounting
an efficacious advertising campaign is too prohibitive to justify the
periodic manipulation of brand acceptability so that "price discrimination" can be practiced. Moreover, it is a gross over-simplification to
assume that consumer reaction to brands is so pliable that it can be
turned off and on like a -faucet. Another significant consideration is
that advertising cannot be practiced with scientific and mathematical
precision; it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict how long it will
take before an advertising campaign will begin to show discernible
results.
A final consideration is that the market acceptability test is not
based upon incidental and slight price differential between branded
items. There must be a "legitimate and stable market preference for
the premium product."' 5 This clearly excludes ephemeral and casual
14. Id. at 649-50 (dissenting opinion). Cassady and Grether's definition is more
succinct: "[R]eliance is placed on consumer-buyer evaluation of the products in determining whether they should be considered alike or different." Cassady & Grether, The
Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 So. CAL. L. Rtv. 241, 248 (1957).
15. 383 U.S. at 653 n.9 (dissenting opinion).
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alterations in consumer preference. Instead, a "demonstrable commercial difference"'" in brand reaction lasting over a significant period
of time is necessary. Requiring a consistent and valid pattern of consumer preference eliminates the majority's objection that market acceptability provides the manufacturer with the opportunity to make
small and random sales under different brands to different customers
so as to create a spurious difference in the preferences of consumers.
B.

Additional Arguments Against Market Acceptability:
Private Brand Discrimination

Market acceptability would also, according to Mr. Justice White's
analysis, permit discriminatory price allowances between privately
branded items. The objections raised by Justice White can be posed
in terms of hypothetical situations:
1. Suppose the manufacturer sold the identical milk product under
different private labels to two different middlemen with one of the
brands possessing greater consumer appeal than the other. Would the
differently labeled products be dissimilar as far as the manufacturer is
concerned? If they are, the manufacturer can, of course, charge a
higher price for the product sold under the brand having the greater
7
consumer preference.'
Justice White would interpret market acceptability so as to hold
that the products in the above situation would be considered similar
for section 2 (a) purposes. His reasoning is that the manufacturer's
"customer, as distinguished from the consumer, will not pay more than
his competitor for private label milk and therefore the milk sold by...
[the manufacturer] under one private brand is really of the same
grade and quality as the milk sold under the other brand even though
ultimate consumers will pay more for one than the other."' 8
The minority also reached the same conclusion but as the result
of traveling a different route. Market acceptability is predicated upon
the consumer being willing to manifest his preference for one brand
16. Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133, 137 (5th Cir. 1964). Judge Hutcheson
added: "That is not to say that merely attaching different, but comparable brand labels
to two products will, without more, make them of unlike 'grade.' Such an artificial
distinction, unaccompanied by any significant difference in the public acceptance of the
two brands would provide an easy means of evading the Act." Borden Co. v. FTC,
supra at 138.
Student commentary on the Court of Appeals decision is divided; In favor:
Comment, Like Grade and Quality: Emergence of the Commercial Standard, 26
OHIO ST. L.J. 294 (1965) ; 65 COLum. L. Rxv. 720 (1965) ; 51 VA. L. Rxv. 703 (1965) ;
unfavorable: 6 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rxv. 966 (1965); 40 NOTR DAmn LAW. 468
(1965) ; 10 VILL. L. RZv. 601 (1965).
17. The problem was posed in the following language: "[W]hy should not Borden
be able to discriminate between two purchasers of private label milk, as long as one
label commands a higher price from consumers than the other and hence is of a
different grade and quality ?" 383 U.S. at 645 n.6.
18. Ibid.
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by paying more than he would for another less acceptable label. And
the reason he pays more is that one brand has been advertised and
promoted to the extent that the consumer feels the brand is worth the
price differential.1 9 There are three possible sources where brand
preference building can originate - the manufacturer, the middleman,
or the retailer. Under Justice Stewart's version of market acceptability,
the consumer preference that the premium product possesses is
attributable to the manufacturer's promotional efforts. Thus, in applying the test, "the relevant comparison would exclude promotional
efforts by persons other than the producer of the premium brand." 2
Consequently, in the hypothetical fact situation, the absence of promotional activity by the manufacturer would mean that no premium
product is involved. And under Stewart's reasoning, since the manufacturer has not promoted either private brand and since both products
are chemically the same, he must charge both middlemen the same
price.
2. Suppose the manufacturer sold the same product at the same
price but under different private labels to a single distributorcustomer who, in turn, advertises one label so extensively that it
possesses greater consumer preference than the other brand. Since
the variance in consumer preference is due exclusively to the customer's
promotional efforts, the minority view of Justice Stewart is that
as far as the sale by the manufactureris concerned, the products are of
"like grade and quality." Justice White objects to this conclusion
since it would allow the distributor-customer to pay the same for
identical but differently labeled products and then sell the less advertised brand at a lower price. And presumably the distributorcustomer would be immune to section 2 (a) prosecution since the
goods are not similar. White concludes that this approach constitutes
a serious defect in the market acceptability test in that it fails to
focus "on consumer preference as determinative of grade and quality"'"
and instead relies "on who spent the advertising money that created
the preference ..."22
There are several arguments that can be raised against the
majority's interpretation of the above possibility. Operating on the
19. "The premium paid for Borden brand milk reflects the consumer's awareness,

promoted through advertising, that these commercial attributes are part and parcel of

the premium product he is purchasing." 383 U.S. at 649-50 (dissenting opinion).

20. Id. at 649 n.2. Howard follows this line of reasoning and concludes: "[T]he
sale of private-label products at prices lower than those of a manufacturer's nationally
advertised products is not necessarily unlawful since the former do not have to bear
the burden of those advertising expenses." HOWARD, LEGAL AsrxcTs op MARKIrN 56

(1964).
21. 383 U.S. at 645 n.6.
22. Ibid.
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assumption that consumer preference is closely related and indeed
engendered by advertising (and thus not mutually exclusive as White
seems to assume) it can be argued that when the customer, through
promotion, builds up consumer preference for one of his brands he
has, at that instant in the distributive process, added another ingredient
to the product. The products are, therefore, no longer similar and a
variance in prices is justified.
There is, however, a more pragmatic argument. It is highly
doubtful whether the manufacturer's customer would even want to
create a variance -in consumer preference between his own two private
brands. There are the marketing logistics of expense, time, etc., that
must be met. Moreover, the essence of private brand competition is
providing the consumer with an opportunity to make a price comparison between the premium and private labels. There is little logic
in a single distributor jeopardizing this comparison with the introduction of a third attention-distracting brand.23
C.

Branding,Promotionand the Views of Commentators

The majority of the commentators who have examined the impact of advertising, promotion, and branding on the like grade and
quality proviso have dismissed a strict physical identity standard as
being completely unrealistic. As early as 1937, only one year after the
enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, two commentators observed
that the impact of advertising, packaging, etc., on the public, can make a
national branded product "as a matter of economic fact, a different
commodity" 24 from a privately branded item. Rowe, who has written
extensively on the Robinson-Patman Act, views the conflict in the
following terms:
Since the cold fact is that the public will pay more money
for a nationally advertised and branded version than it would pay
for the physically same but promotionally unknown product sans
brand, a manufacturer who sells a branded and an unbranded
variation of the same basic item at a price differential is not
"discriminating" in any economic sense. The purchaser of the
unbranded version of the seller's product naturally pays less because he get less.25
23. This, of course, does not mean that there will not be competition between
competing private brands. But the presence of the national or premium brand is most
necessary as a basis of comparison. See BACKMAN, PRICE PRACTiCES AND PRICE
POLICrES 405-06 (1953).
24. ZORN & FELDMAN, BusINEss UNDER THE NEw PRIc4 LAWS 77 (1937). The
authors advocated a competitive test but concluded that the "complexities involved in
applying such a test" would preclude its adoption. ZORN & FELDMAN, op. cit. supra at 78.
25. RowE, PRIcn DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 72-73

(1962).
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Rowe advocates the use of a "commercial fungibility" test when
ascertaining grade and quality under section 2 (a). Goods are fungible
and therefore of "like grade and quality" when the business community
shows no preference for either product (or either brand) when they
are -being sold at the same price. Thus if two branded items were
"normally sold in the market at the same 'going price,' "2 they would
be of like grade and quality. The emphasis is on what the business
community, as opposed to an individual customer, is willing to pay.
And Rowe believes that under usual conditions the business community will pay more for nationally advertised and promoted brands
than for regional brands. For example, under Rowe's test nationally
advertised brands of gasoline, since they attract higher prices, would
not be "fungible" with unbranded gas and hence not of "like grade
and quality."
Cassady and Grether, in an in depth and marketplace oriented
study of the problem, concluded that an "economic-value or marketacceptance" test was preferable to a physical identity standard. Their
studies prompted them to conclude that products sold under a national
brand are different in terms of grade and quality from the same
product sold under a private label for three reasons: First, the source
of supply for the premium product is not necessarily the same as that
for the unbranded item. This is because the manufacturer has complete monopoly power over the distribution of his national brand while
a purchaser can obtain the same product, minus the national brand,
from any supplier who agrees to furnish it. Second, there might be an
actual physical disparity between the manufacturer's brand and the
unbranded product. "Quality differentials between well-known and
little-known brands may be due to carelessness, insufficient supply of
top-quality products to meet all demands, or deliberate quality depreciation.""8 (Borden's Supreme Court brief contained this same argument.)29 Finally, they argue that the higher priced and heavily ad26. Id. at 75.
27. Cassady & Grether, supra note 14, at 248.
28. Id. at 264. One advertising executive complained that the Borden decision
"ignored the added care and quality control supervision, both before and after the
product leaves the factory, which the brand name manufacturer gives only to the
products bearing his valuable trade name." Borden Decision Spells Change - but

Changes Already in Wind, A A Learns, Advertising Age, April 4, 1966, p. 120.
29. To assure the continued high quality of its Borden brand product as it came

into the hands of the consumer, the respondent rigorously policed the flow of the
product throughout the channels of distribution. Great care was exercised to see

that it was stored under optimum conditions and that it was moved toward the
consumer with the minimum of delay. First packed, first shipped was the rule,
even though that often involved costly shipping from far-away plants or storage
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vertised national brand reaches a different strata of the market than
the lesser priced unbranded item."0
Of the studies which have probed with any degree of depth into
the problem of fitting branding into the definitional boundaries of
grade and quality only the Attorney General's Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws has embraced the FTC's position. (This is discounting those commentators who espouse physical identity but do
so with no analysis of the problem or by basing their conclusions on
past Trade Commission rulings.) 3 ' A majority 2 of the Committee
acknowledged the efficacy of advertising, promotion, and other marketing techniques in developing "distinct consumer preferences that
manifest themselves in real price margins"3 3 between premium and
regular brands. Nevertheless they concluded that a failure to use
physical identity as a standard would result in the Government becoming involved in complex and cumbersome market investigations.
Moreover, any other test would enable the seller to easily evade
the act "through artificial variations in the packaging, advertising or
design of goods which the seller wishes to distribute at differential
prices."3 4 The Committee recommended that the distribution of national and private branded products be analyzed under the competitive
injury or the cost justification portions of the act. 5
warehouses. In addition, the respondent had more than 200 representatives out
in the field, going into the retail stores and making code dating and sampling checks
of the freshness of the shelf and storeroom stocks of the Borden brand product.
Brief for Respondent, pp. 4-5, FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
30. In this connection it might be pointed out that the authors were critical of the
legislative dialogue upon which the majority in the Borden Case placed heavy reliance.
It is interesting (but somewhat appalling) that various legislators and commentators seem to think that well-known brands and little-known or unknown brands
must be sold at the same price. The following colloquy [the reference being to the
remarks cited by Justice White, 383 U.S. at 643] ...illustrates this misconception.
Cassady & Grether, supra note 14, at 265 n.56.
For an excellent analysis of the branding problem in terms of its effects on competition see Jordan, Robinson-Patman Act Aspects of Duel Distribution By Brand
of Consumer Goods, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 394 (1965).
31. See AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THH
ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 39 (2d ed. 1959); BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 13
(1964); EDWARDS, THE PRics DISCRIMINATION LAW 31, 463-64 (1959); PATMAN,
COMPLETE GUIDE To THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 27 (1938); Seidman, Price Discrimination Cases, reprinted in 2 HOPFMAN, ANTITRUST LAW AND TtCHNIQuS 409,
424-28 (1963) ; STICKELLS, LEGAL CONTROL oiv BUSINESS PRACTICE 437 (1965).
32. The minority concluded that "a price discrimination law can consider heavily
advertised and anonymous or private-brand merchandise on an equal legal footing only
at a serious distortion of economic facts. Accordingly, they propose that demonstrable
economic differences be evaluated under the statutory term "grade" as distinct from
any purely physical consideration of "quality." Ar'y GEN. NAT'L COMm. ANTITRUST
REP. 158 (1955).
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 158-59.
35. For a contra position, see Jordan, supra note 30, at 421.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

III.

PRODUCT SIMILARITY

As A

[VOL.

12 : p. 251

REQUISITE FOR THE

GOOD

FAITH MEETING OF COMPETITION

Section 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act furnishes the vendor
with an opportunity to show that he reduced his prices in good faith
so as to meet competitors prices."' It has been noted that section 2 (b),
unlike section 2 (a), contains no express reference to "like grade and
quality." It has likewise been noted that the FTC acknowledges that
the good faith meeting of competition clearly envisions a seller reducing the price of his product so as to meet the prices charged by a
competitor who is selling a "similar" product.
There are, however, several differences between the application
of a product similarity standard in section 2 (b) and the interpretation
of "like grade and quality" in section 2 (a). In section 2 (a) any
product comparison is between the seller's own products while 2 (b)
requires a comparison of the products sold by competing sellers. The
second and most important difference is that the Trade Commission
considers the physical identity test that it uses under section 2 (a)
as an inappropriate means by which to measure product similarity
when 2 (b) is invoked. Thus, where two products are acknowledged
to have the same physical properties and one is sold under a national
brand and is classified as premium while the other is a local or regular
product, the seller of the premium item cannot, with section 2 (b)
impunity, reduce his prices to the level of those charged by the vendor
of the regular product. (This is of course the factual background
that was hypothesized in the Retainer Company situation.) The
FTC applies its own version of market acceptability and holds that
even though the products are chemically, physically, and functionally
the same, they are nevertheless dissimilar to the extent that a price
differential between the two items must be maintained. 7
The Trade Commission's position is premised upon the existence
of a "premium" product. Yet how can one product be labeled premium
when it contains the identical chemical properties of the competing
"regular" item? The Trade Commission insists that public acceptance
is the test; if the public is willing to pay more for one brand, then
that brand, so it is reasoned, has premium status. Thus the Commission
refused to allow Anheuser-Busch to reduce its price level for Budweiser - advertised as the beer that "still sells at the premium prices
around the world""8 - to that charged for the regional brands in the
36. See generally Austin, Robinson-Patman and Meeting Competition: A Myriad
of Problems With No Solutions, 40 TUL. L. Rev. 313 (1966).
37. See cases in note 6 supra. See generally Austin, Meeting Competition in Good
Faith, and the "Premium" Product, 14 CLMv.-MAR. L. Rev. 610 (1965).

38. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 297 (1957).
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St. Louis area. The FTC expressed their position in the following
language:
It is evident that Budweiser could and did successfully command
a premium price in the St. Louis market as it has in most of the
other markets in the nation. The test in such a case is not
necessarily a difference in quality but the fact that the public is
willing to buy the product at a higher price in a normal market.
Clearly, therefore, respondent's reduction from the premium price
to match the prices of the regional beers ...

was not a meeting of

competition. The effect was to undercut competition. 9

Realistically the Trade Commission has recognized that public
acceptance "is determined in large measure by factors other than actual
grade and quality."4 In Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers,
Inc.,41 it was argued that packaging, which is a form of advertising,
was such a factor. Both Beech-Nut and Gerber are manufacturers of
strained and junior baby foods. Gerber sold its baby food in tin
containers while Beech-Nut packed their product in glass. While it
was admitted by both parties that their respective products were
comparable in food content, it was also acknowledged that the baby
food packaged in glass sold at a higher price than Gerber's product
which was marketed in tin containers. The trial court concluded that
"the hard core of the controversy revolves about the packaging of
[the] . . . respective products -

tin against glass containers."42

While acknowledging that the standardization of products has
caused "attractive packaging [to] . . . become a developing aspect of

competitive activity"43 and hence a means of engendering consumer
preference, the court nevertheless denied premium product status to
the bady food packaged in glass containers. The court felt that to
"impose on the more attractive package a disability to meet the price
at which it is acceptable to the consumer may of itself chill this developing area of competition." 44 The court clearly felt that Beech-Nut's
high prices were not justified by consumer preference and thus the
price differential was not due to ,the consumer's willingness to pay
more for glass packaged baby food. In other words, Beech-Nut was
confronted with falling sales because they had priced themselves out
of the market. Moreover, both firms advertised their containers as
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
life see
44.

Id. at 302.
Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923, 952 (1953).
160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 919.
Id. at 922. For a light treatment of the impact of packaging on contemporary
Lynes, The Packaged Society, Harper's, Aug., 1966, p. 18.
160 F. Supp. at 922.
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having attributes superior to their competitor's package, thus tending
to erase any significance that packaging might have had.
The Commission has also recognized the vital role that advertising
and promotion plays in creating what have become known as "major"
brands of gasoline. In the Standard Oil litigation it was noted that
"well advertised brands of gasoline have come to be known as major
brands. ...

5 The classification "major" is of course merely a synonym

for premium.4"
There is very little to distinguish the FTC's use of public acceptance analysis in section 2 (b) actions from Justice Stewart's
market acceptability test." Both go far beyond a strict reliance on a
physical comparison between products. Under both tests advertising
and other promotional techniques operate so as to create differences
between "like" products. Moreover, both tests involve the task of
accurately measuring the intangibles and cross-currents of consumer
tastes and proclivities.4
IV.

BRANDS: THE CORE OF THE CONTROVERSY

A.

The History and Development of Branding

Much of the difficulty and uncertainty that has been encountered
by counsel and courts alike in endeavoring to gain a true perspective
of the product identity problem stems from a basic unfamiliarity with
the objectives and the consequences of branding. This is at least
partly due to the fact that while the judicial world has, over the last
twenty years, absorbed refined economic theory and thinking,49 they
have strangely failed to appreciate fully the impact and scope of fast
changing contemporary marketing techniques.
Branding essentially constitutes a means of indicating to the
public the organization that 'is responsible for the quality of the
product. It might be a name, a symbol, or it might be both elements
integrated into a distinctive package. The use of brands is not new;
45. Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923, 952 (1953).
46. As might be expected the distinction between premium brands of gas and nonpremium brands is not always clear. Commissioner Elman, dissenting in American Oil
Co., 60 F.T.C. 1786 (1962), complained: "[H]ow was respondent in October 1958 to
know that 'Paraland,' owned by a 'major' producer (Phillips), would be regarded by
the Commission in June 1962 as a 'private' brand entitled, apparently as a matter of
law, to a 'normal' differential of 2 cents a gallon lower than 'major' brands ?" American
Oil Co., supra at 1825.
47. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
48. In addition, under section 2(b) once the "premium" and "regular" brand
relationship has been established there remains the substantial problem of determining
the "normal" price differential between the products. See Austin, supra note 37, at
622-25; ATr'y GFN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST Rnp. 184 (1955).
49. See generally Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42

YALE

L.J. 668 (1933).
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they can be traced through the trademark back to the craftsman's mark.
"The craftsman's mark under the guild system was compulsory, its
purpose being, not to provide buyers with a symbol by which they
might recognize desirable merchandise, but to furnish a 'police' mark
for the guilds."" ° As the marketing distance between the manufacturer and the customer lengthened, the importance of the mark increased. The most feasible method of assuring the public that merchandise was of high quality was through an easily identifiable mark.
Thus, the mark, as a guide to quality, became a valuable asset on its
own. The Industrial Revolution's mass production methods widened,
both geographically and ;by distribution channels, the line of communication between producer and ultimate customer. As a result, the
mark or brand became even more necessary as a means of bridging the
knowledge hiatus between manufacturer and customer. 5'
However, there is another significant and certainly more contemporary impetus behind the use of brands. The emergence in this
century of an oligopolistic market structure, where sales and production are controlled by a few large dominant manufacturers, has
made brand emphasis an extremely vital part of the sales technique.
Because only a few large manufacturers dominate the oligopolistic
industrial society, there is a general awareness by all, of each individual participant's important marketing decisions."' Thus any drastic
marketing policy change by one oligopolist is quickly picked up and
countered by the other firms. One significant result is that the
competitive relationship between the competing organizations in an
oligopoly is usually not manifested in open and direct price warfare.
Instead, companies prefer to compete through less observable and more
subtle methods. One economist, J. K. Galbraith, sums up the effect of
oligopoly as follows:
A close examination of oligopoly shows that price competition,
the very motor of the competitive model, is not only sharply
circumscribed but has to be. When there are only a few firms in
an industry and their products are closely substitutable, a price
cut by one company must ... be matched by the others. Otherwise the firm with the lower price will draw a disproportionate
share of the business in the short run and, through operation
of habit and customer good will, may retain it in the long run. 3
50. BORDEN, ADVERTISING IN OUR EcONOMY 24 (1945).
51. See generally SCHECHTEUR, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

OF THE LAW RELAT-

ING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925).

52. See generally CARTER & SNAVELY, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 214-46
(1961); CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (6th ed. 1948);
FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW (1949); TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 24-43 (1965).
53. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT O COUNTERVAILING POWER
44-45 (Sentry ed. 1956).
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If price competition is no longer satisfactory, firms must resort
to other means of -increasing sales. A popular maneuver has been the
use of massive promotional campaigns to create brand loyalty. Vast
sums of money are expended in attempts to persuade the purchaser
that one brand is superior and more desirable than competing products.54 Thus the undesirable pitfalls and dangers of price competition
are avoided in favor of promotional warfare. Branding is, in other
words, an integral component of product differentiation. Sellers "distinguish their products through packaging, branding, and the offering
of auxiliary service to buyers, and by advertising and sales promotional
efforts....

.""

Even though competing products contain the same chemi-

cal properties they may get a different consumer reaction. A prestigious
brand or a distinctive package5 6 may give a company's product the
edge over the offerings of its competitors.
In summary, there are two significant and relevant points reflected
in contemporary branding methodology. The first is that branding is
now solidly established as an important and permanent component of
the selling process. The permancence of a firm's market position
depends to a large extent upon the capacity to create and to maintain
a satisfactory brand image. Second, in today's marketplace the
effectiveness of branding depends primarily upon advertising. It is
against the efficacy of advertising techniques, therefore, that the effects
of branding must be measured.
B.

The Efficacy of Branding

Advertising is not a science; its effects upon the public are not
easily measured.57 This means that brand preference, cultivated as it
is by advertising, is likewise not susceptible to precise measurement.
Nevertheless, through experience and countless market examinations,
specialists have been able to develop reliable brand theories.
54. Other reasons for brand promotion include: The establishment of a stable and
continuous market, establishing a direct goodwill relationship between manufacturer
and the ultimate customer, stability of selling prices which allows improvement of the
product, helps to establish resale price maintenance policy, and finally forecasting and
budgeting is made easier. See DAvis & PALMER, MARKET RESEARCH AND SCIENTIFIC
DISTRIBUTION 237 (1957).
55. BAIN, BARRIERS To Niw COMP-TITION 114 (1956).
56. Distinctive packaging was a crucial factor in the Gerber case. 160 F. Supp.
at 922. See generally Lippincott & Margulies, Packaging In Top-Level Planning,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1956, p. 46.
57. Judge Learned Hand commented that "the art of publicity is a black art" and
that the "individual is as helpless against it as the child is helpless against the formulas
with which he is indoctrinated. Not only is it possible by these means to shape his
tastes, his feelings, his desires and his hopes; but it is possible to convert him into a
fanatical zealot, ready to torture and destroy and to suffer mutilation and death for an
obscene faith, baseless in fact and morally monstrous." Proceedings in Memory of
Mr. Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. IX, XV (1942). See generally Brown, Advertising And
The Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALP L.J. 1165 (1948).
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The particular "type" or "make" of product involved plays an
important role in determining the effectiveness of branding. When it
is impossible for the purchaser to visually determine the quality of
the product at the time of purchase, the use of a brand by the manufacturer is imperative. The brand or trademark operates as a guide to
quality. Merchandise .such as drugs, cosmetics, appliances and types
of food products, have all 'been found to require strong brand identification.58 Distinctive branding is also necessary in those situations
where there is no noticeable distinction in the appearance between
competing products. An effective brand policy can create an identifiable
product image in the customer',s mind -that distinguishes the promoted
product from the competing items despite the fact that both products
are basically, if not actually, similar. 9 This is, it will be remembered,
the essence of "product differentiation."
Psychology plays a persuasive role in creating and maintaining
brand image. It has been noted that a brand name "ismore than the
label employed to differentiate among the manufacturers of a product.
It is a complex symbol that represents a variety of ideas and
attributes." 6 And because of the significant role that psychological
influences play in forming every consumer's buying habits, and because
these influences can be manipulated, it can be argued that brand
imagery assumes the same degree of importance to the sales transaction as do the physical or chemical ingredients of the product.6 ' As
a matter of fact, in some instances the subjective impression that the
brand makes on the purchaser may even outweigh the more tangible
factors. Examples of strong brand imagery include Commander
Whitehead (Schweppes), the man with the eyepatch (Hathaway
shirts), and Elsie the Borden Cow.
To determine the character of these psychological factors and to
aid in attempting to guage the extent to which nonrational selection
plays in brand identification, firms now spend large sums in market
research. Market research, in its broadest aspects, involves the use of
psychological testing techniques as a means of determining the likes
58. See

BORDEN,

op. cit. supra note 50, at 31.

59. The manufacturer who sells more than one product must decide whether to
market all his products under the same brand (a family brand) or whether to sell each
item under a separate brand. See CUNDIFF & STILL, BASIC MARKETING 432-35 (1964).
60. Gardner & Levy, The Product and the Brand, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April
1955, pp. 33, 35.
61. One authority states that "there are countless instances where the nonrational
elements of the symbol are apparently wholly responsible for the product's desirability,
conveying their meanings almost entirely below the threshold of conscious awareness."
MARTINEAU, MOTIVATION IN ADVERTISING 148 (1957). See also BRINK & KELLEY, THE
MANAGEMENT OF PROMOTION 155-65 (1963).
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and dislikes of the public and then composing a sales campaign in line
with the findings. 2
Are the large expenditures for researching and building brand
imagery justified?63 Is there such a thing as brand loyalty and can
it be maintained? There are no conclusive answers. However, studies
reveal that nationally known brands (at least in some product lines)
are preferred by customers despite the competition of private brands
selling at lower prices and despite other sales gimmicks. That nationally
advertised brands do constitute an important and independent element
of the sales exchange is reflected in the following comment:
A survey by Burns Roper, partner of Elmo Roper and Associates,
showed why so many people continue to buy appliances at stores
which sell them at higher prices than other local dealers in the
neighborhood: While delivery service, willingness to stand behind a product, and charge accounts play an important role, Mr.
Roper pointed out, loyalty to known brands by this group of
consumers is so strong that even when store brands' competition
offers gimmicks
and attractive deals, they fail to lure her (or
6 4
him) away.

The impact of branding upon consumer choice has 'been accented
by the increasing use of so-called private brands. By purchasing unmarked merchandise, often from a manufacturer distributing a national brand, and then attaching their own brand label, middlemen
and distributors hope to develop a brand loyalty of their own.6 5 It is a
brand loyalty that is geared to reach the price conscious consumer.
And to reach this objective the price differential must be great enough
to attract customers away from the national brand. If the distributor
is successful in marketing the private brand, he accomplishes two
things: he creates a new market and thus "ceases to be merely part of
the producer's distributional conduit"6 and, in addition, he gains a
larger amount of independence in dealing with producers.
62. See generally
(1957).

DAVIES & PALMER, MARKET REsEARCH AND SCIENTIFIc Dis-

TRIBUTION

63. For the view that advertising represents a wasteful phase of our economy see
THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958).
64. WESTING & ALBAUM, MODERN MARKETING THOUGHT 249 (1964). For additional examples of national brand preference see Cassady & Grether, The Proper
Interpretation Of "Like Grade And Quality" Within the Meaning of Section 2(a) of
The Robinson-PatmanAct, 30 So. CAL. L. Rrv. 241, 256-62 (1957).
65. For a discussion of the market advantages of using private brands, see BORDEN,
op. cit. supra note 50, at 36-37; CUNDIFF & STILL, op. cit. supra note 59, at 435-36;
WESTING & ALBAUM, op. cit. supra note 64, at 242-51.
The use of private labels is not a post-war phenomenon. Studies reveal that in
1930, 45% of retail grocery and meat chain stores sold some products under their own
labels. FTC, Chain Store Private Brands, S. Doc. No. 142, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933).
66. Mueller, Appendix E, in BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 143 (1964).
GALBRAITH,
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The Brand As A Component of the Product:
Additional Support

The brand loyalty and consumer preference of any product has
a fragile existence. It is always subject to attack from competitors and
hence must be constantly nurtured by advertising and promotion. But
the fact remains that -brand loyalty does exist and different brands do
generate varied consumer reaction. And it is interesting to note that
strong support for the proposition that branding constitutes a distinguishable component of the product comes from a source outside the
field of marketing. By recognizing and enforcing trademark and fair
trade laws, legislatures and courts expressly acknowledge the market
and legal significance of the national brand.
A trademark is a "device, adopted and used, by a manufacturer or
merchant, in order to designate the goods that he manufactures, or
sells, and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by another .. "67 By identifying the source of the product, by assuring
quality, and by developing goodwill, the trademark serves the same
purposes as the brand."8 Frequently a brand is a trademark and thereby
receives protection against infringers. Consequently, if a trademark
is "in a qualified sense . . . property, protected and alienable," '6 9 it

can cogently be argued that a brand, particularly a nationally recognized one, is surely a separate and distinguishable ingredient of the
product.
Fair trade laws expressly acknowledge the separate quality of a
brand. The Illinois statute is characteristic; it protects merchandise
"which bears ...the trade mark, brand or name of the producer or

owner of such commodity and which is in fair and open competition
with commodities of the same general class ....-" The effect of these
laws is to allow the producers of branded items to specify the prices
at which their product may be resold. The underlying thebry is that
branding or trademarks add to the value of the product in terms of
67. UPTON, TRADEMARKS 9 (1860).
68.
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that
we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe
he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same - to
convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of
the commodity upon which it appears.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
See generally Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
IRv. 813 (1927).
69. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1926).
70. ILL. Rrv. STAT. ch. 1212, § 188 (1953).
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goodwill and that to fail to prevent the commodity to be sold at less
than fair trade levels is to allow the producer's goodwill to be diluted
or erased.

71

V.

CONCLUSION

The use of the physical identity standard cannot be justified on the
basis that it represents a valid measurement of product similarity.
There is too much evidence to the contrary. Legal commentators and
marketing experts concur in acknowledging that prestige brands receive a different consumer reaction than the less promoted regular
brand. Likewise, the cases (excepting, of course, the final Borden
decision and the Commission rulings) have realistically recognized
that chemically and physically identical products can be different under
the Robinson-Patman Act when consumers are willing to pay more
for one item than another. And even the Trade Commission considers
the physical identity standard inappropriate when section 2 (b) is
invoked. Therefore, in light of the persuasive arguments against its
use, how can the Trade Commission justify recourse to physical identity
under section 2 (a) ?
One argument, a negative argument, in favor of physical identity,
is that the market acceptability standard is too difficult to apply. It is
not an easy task to satisfactorily establish that there is a "legitimate
and stable market preference for the premium product."7 2 The most
realistic measurement of consumer preference is the existence of a
discernible price differential between two "like" products. Such a
measurement is not easily made. What constitutes a price differential?
A two cents variance obviously does not have the same market significance with all products. Moreover, how long, in terms of days,
weeks, months, must the price difference exist before it can be said
that consumer preference has converted "like" products into a premium-regular brand relationship.
Closer analysis, however, reveals that difficulty of application is
not a valid argument against the market acceptability test. The expertise of the Trade Commission is geared for precisely this type of
market exploration. The FTC has never avoided the equally intricate
investigations that are often necessary to ascertain the boundaries of the
71. Thus it might be possible to avoid the impact of fair trade statutes by
"removing the mark or brand from the commodity - thus separating the physical
property, which he owns, from the good will, which is the property of another - and
then selling the commodity at his own price, provided he can do so without utilizing
the good will of the latter as an aid to that end." Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v.
Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 195 (1936).
72. FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. at 653 n.9 (dissenting opinion).
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relevant market 73 or the ticklish problem of inclusion-exclusion involved in determining the line of commerce. Also, the Commission's
"willingness to engage in the exhaustive analysis of injury to
competition and cost justification under its 'physical identity' test of
§ 2 (a) demonstrates that the Commission's resources would be more
than adequate to determine the level of commercial preference sufficient to negate a finding of 'like grade and quality' under a market
test of § 2 (a). ' 74 Finally, the burden of determining consumer
preference has already 'been assumed by the FTC under section 2 (b)."
Analysis leads to the conclusion that the use of a physical identity
test under 2 (a) and a market acceptability standard under 2 (b)
can only be justified upon policy grounds. Implicit in the majority's
opinion in Borden and in the FTC's Supreme Court brief is the theory
that such a construction "appears... .to further the purpose and policy
of the Robinson-Patman Act."7 6 Simply stated, the Trade Commission 'begins its inquiry behind the presumption that the jurisdictional
requirement of "like grade and quality" 'has been satisfied. This
presumption is predicated upon the theory that the purpose of the act
is to proscribe price discrimination and the Commission should not
be prevented from this objective by time consuming preliminary
obstacles. Hence there is no inconsistancy between the different
approaches followed under section 2 (a) and 2 ('b) since, under the
latter, the Commission has already reached price discrimination.
The policy argument ignores (or avoids) one significant factor:
There can be no price discrimination if, at the threshold, the products
involved are not in reality of "like grade and quality."
73. See, e.g., Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
74. 383 U.S. at 653 n.9 (dissenting opinion).
75. See cases collected in note 6 supra.
76. 383 U.S. at 643. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-22, FTC v. Borden Co., 383
U.S. 637 (1966).
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